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GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE WITH 
LAW SCHOOL CLINICS AND  
ACCESS TO JUSTICE:  
WHEN IS THERE A LEGAL REMEDY? 
Peter A. Joy† 
INTRODUCTION 
Government interference with law school clinics resulting in the 
denial of low-income people’s access to justice is not new. Recent 
events remind us that it is unlikely to fade away. Just last year, a law 
school clinic representing clients against the interests of a large 
poultry company spurred some legislators to introduce a budget 
amendment to withhold funds from the University of Maryland unless 
its law school disclosed information about its clients and how clinical 
programs at other law schools operate.1 In Louisiana, the state 
legislature considered a bill to bar law school clinics that receive 
public funds, including private universities such as Tulane, from 
                                                                                                                 
† Vice Dean & Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis 
School of Law.  
1 The Maryland Senate approved proposed budget amendments to Senate Bill 140 that 
would have withheld up to $750,000 of the appropriations to the University System Maryland 
until the University of Maryland School of Law submitted a report on individual cases litigated 
by its Environmental Law Clinic, including information on the Clinic’s clients and expenditures, 
and the University System submitted a second report on law school clinics in other states, 
describing the criteria used to select cases and funding sources for the clinical programs. S.B. 
140, 428th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011), http://mlis.state.md.us/2011rs2010rs/bills/ 
sb/sb0140fsb0140t.pdf; see also Leslie A. Gordon, Taking Their Pains to the Clinic: Legislators 
Punish Law School Clinics for Suing Community Businesses, 96 A.B.A.J. 20 (2010) (describing 
the pressure and opposition law school clinics face when representing clients who are unpopular 
with legislatures, alumni, and local businessmen); Karen Sloan, Independence of Maryland Law 
School Clinic Is Challenged by Lawmakers, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 29, 2010, available at http://www. 
law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202447072923 (describing the attempt by Maryland 
legislature to require law school clinic to turn over confidential client information); David F. 
Fahrenthold, Legislature Eyes U-Md. Law Clinic After Suit Against Chicken Farm, WASH. 
POST., Mar. 28, 2010, at C4 (describing Maryland legislative efforts to withhold funding for the 
University of Maryland’s environmental law clinic); Ian Urbina, School Law Clinics Face 
Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, at A12 (describing the Maryland legislature’s attempt to 
cut law clinic funding if client information is not provided). 
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suing companies or government entities unless the legislature 
specifically approved each lawsuit.2  
In both instances, the state legislators sought to restrict how the 
law schools could educate their students, and, in Louisiana, whether 
certain clients and legal claims could have legal representation by law 
school clinics. These proposals prompted many, including the 
American Bar Association (ABA),3 over 450 law professors,4 and 
fifty deans,5 to object to one or both of the proposals.6 The president 
of the ABA criticized the proposed Maryland legislation as “an 
intrusion on the attorney-client relationship,”7 and the Louisiana 
legislation as “[d]epriving the poorest citizens of these vital [legal] 
services.”8  
Both legislative efforts failed,9 but would there have been legal 
recourse if either had passed? One may think that such governmental 
intrusions into educational programs trigger academic freedom claims 
and possibly other legal rights. But when it comes to academic 
freedom, the individual faculty member tends to conflate the norm of 
academic freedom on university campuses regulating relationships 
between the individual faculty member and administrators with legal 
rights. This may lead the typical professor to believe that the First 
                                                                                                                 
2 Louisiana State Senator Robert Adley, R-Benton, introduced S.B. 549, which would 
have denied $45 million in yearly funds to Tulane University unless Tulane curtailed the work 
of its Environmental Law Clinic. S.B. 549, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2010), available at 
http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=690665; see also S.B. 140, supra 
note 1; Gordon, supra note 1; Urbina, supra note 1. 
3 Statement of ABA President Lamm Re: Proposed Legislation Affecting Funding for 
University of Maryland School of Law, ABA NOW (April 1, 2010), http://www.abanow.org/ 
2010/04/statement-of-aba-president-lamm-re-proposed-legislation-affecting-funding-for-
university-of-maryland-school-of-law/ [hereinafter ABA Maryland Clinic Statement]; Statement 
of ABA President Lamm Re: Louisiana Senate Bill 549 to Restrict Law School Clinical 
Activities, ABA NOW (May 12, 2010), http://www.abanow.org/2010/05/statement-of-aba-
president-lamm-re-louisiana-senate-bill-549-to-restrict-law-school-clinic-activities/ [hereinafter 
ABA Louisiana Clinic Statement]. 
4 Petition from Law School Faculty and Deans to the Honorable Members of the 
Maryland General Assembly, available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/about/features/enviro 
clinic/documents/Faculty_deans.pdf. 
5 Id.  
6 Some of the other letters protesting the proposed Maryland legislation came from the 
Association of American Law Schools, American Association of University Professors, Clinical 
Legal Education Association, Maryland legal services providers, and the Society of American 
Law Teachers. Expressions of Support, UNIV. OF MD. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.umaryland. 
edu/about/features/enviroclinic/support.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
7 ABA Maryland Clinic Statement, supra note 3. 
8 ABA Louisiana Clinic Statement, supra note 3. 
9 See Gordon, supra note 1. Although the original budget amendment in Maryland failed, 
the Maryland House of Delegates adopted a House Budget Amendment that did not withhold 
funding but does require the School of Law to report on Environmental Law Clinic cases over 
the past two years by listing each case and non-privileged expenditures. Maryland House 
Budget Amendment, http://www.law.umaryland.edu/about/features/enviroclinic/house_amend 
ment.html [hereinafter House Budget Amendment] (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
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Amendment provides robust protection for academic freedom, when 
this belief does not necessarily translate into reality in the courts.  
For example, the Maryland legislature did pass an alternative 
budget amendment that does not withhold funds, but does require the 
University of Maryland School of Law to report on its environmental 
law clinic cases over the past two years by listing each case and non-
privileged expenditures.10 The chair of the House Appropriations 
Committee said that the law school had received the message, “We’ll 
be watching.”11 One of the state senators who opposed the 
government interference characterized the legislative action as “better 
than it was, but it’s still a pretty big abridgement of academic 
freedom.”12 He added that the language was a threat: “If you guys are 
getting involved in issues that we don’t like, or you’re bothering 
people that we do like, we want you to shut up.”13  
Dean Phoebe Haddon of the University of Maryland School of 
Law addressed the government’s interference by sounding a similar 
theme that the government also interfered with how the clinics do 
their educational work. She said, “There is a specter of intimidation 
that could affect how the clinics choose clients or accept cases.”14 The 
former director of the University of Maryland’s Environmental Law 
Clinic, Rena Steinzor, added: “It’s not acceptable, because it is an 
effort to chill and intimidate us for taking cases that cause trouble in 
Annapolis.”15  
Yet, the University of Maryland is not taking legal action to 
challenge this requirement, and it is unlikely that it will. First, there 
does not appear to be a cognizable legal claim that would prevent the 
legislature from accessing non-privileged, non-confidential client 
information.16 Second, there is the practical matter that the state 
                                                                                                                 
10 House Budget Amendment, supra note 9. 
11 Nicholas Sohr, State Delegate to UMd. Law Clinic: “We’ll Be Watching,” THE DAILY 
RECORD (Apr. 7, 2010), http://thedailyrecord.com/eyeonannapolis/2010/04/07/state-senator-to-
umd-law-clinic-well-be-watching. 
12 Fahrenthold, supra note 1 (quoting Sen. Brian E. Frosh). 
13 Id. 
14 Into the Fire: State Legislators Fuel a Heated Debate on Clinical Legal Education, IN 
PRACTICE (The Clinical Law Program at the Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, Balt., Md.), Spring. 
2010, at 3, available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/programs/clinic/documents/ClinicSpring 
2010.pdf. 
15 Fahrenthold, supra note 1. 
16 Although the budget amendment refers only to non-privileged expenditures, the law 
school has an ethical duty not to disclose any confidential information. MARYLAND RULES OF 
LAWYER PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2007) (“The confidentiality rule, for example, applies 
not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating 
to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as 
authorized or required by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.”). 
Attorney-client privilege is grounded in the rules of evidence and is more limited than the 
ethical duty of confidentiality. Privileged communications are those between the lawyer and 
 2/4/2011 1:56:50 PM 
1090 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:4 
legislature funds the university. Even if the university could prevail 
on this matter, university administrators may decide that the threat of 
future funding cuts is too great a risk when weighed against the 
burden of the reporting requirement.17 
As the Maryland situation illustrates, government interference with 
law school clinical programs is both real and complicated. While 
there is a growing body of scholarship examining interference in 
clinical programs from a variety of perspectives,18 scholars have paid 
little attention to the idea that government interference may result in 
the denial of legal rights to clinical faculty, law schools, and 
universities, as well as threatening access to justice for the clinic 
clients—individuals and communities otherwise unable to afford legal 
representation.  
This Article analyzes government interference in clinical programs 
and suggests some legal remedies that may be available to challenge 
this interference. Part I begins with a brief explanation of clinical 
legal education methodology and the role law school clinics play in 
providing access to justice for tens of thousands clients each year. 
Part II provides an analysis of academic freedom, both as a norm on 
university campuses and as a legal principle. Part III analyzes 
instances of government interference, with an emphasis on those 
governmental actions that triggered legal actions seeking remedies. 
Finally, I conclude with lessons learned about the types of remedies 
most available when the government interferes in clinical programs. 
I. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Law school clinical programs teach law students by providing 
legal assistance to poor and other marginalized clients. Under the 
                                                                                                                 
 
client made for the purpose of rendering legal assistance or advice. See id.; see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000). 
17 It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the extent to which a state legislature 
may control a university’s or law school’s educational policy, such as the types of programs to 
offer, through funding decisions. As briefly discussed in Part III, this may vary depending on 
how the university governance is organized by the state constitution. See infra notes 56–58 and 
accompanying text. Elizabeth Schneider explores this issue to some extent, and concludes that it 
is not clear. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Political Interference in Law School Clinical Programs: 
Reflections on Outside Interference and Academic Freedom, 11 J.C. & U.L. 179, 194–95 n.85 
(1984). 
18 E.g., Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying Access 
to Justice, 74 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1999) (examining the implications of a Louisiana Supreme 
Court amendment limiting clients law students can represent); Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, 
An Ethics Critique of Interference in Law School Clinics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1971 (2003) 
(examining the ethical considerations raised by interference in law school clinics); Schneider, 
supra note 17. 
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supervision of faculty, law students interview clients and witnesses, 
analyze client problems, provide legal advice, negotiate with lawyers 
for opposing parties, conduct legal research, prepare legal documents 
and pleadings, perform transactional work, and represent clients 
before administrative agencies, courts, and other tribunals.  
A law school clinic is both a law office and a classroom, and a 
clinic client’s legal problems, including the client’s legal claims and 
defenses, become the teaching materials that faculty use to instruct 
law students in the lawyering skills and professional values they need 
to become effective, ethical lawyers. In many ways, a law school 
clinic is the laboratory where students learn how to apply the 
analytical thinking and legal theory they learned in the classroom to 
solve client problems.19  
Today, there are clinical programs of some form in every ABA-
approved law school.20 In addition to educating law students, the 
clinical programs also provide access to justice for clients in need of 
legal representation. A recent national survey found that students in 
law school clinics provide more than 2.4 million hours of free legal 
services to more than 120,000 clients in a wide variety of cases each 
year.21 Law students represent children, the elderly, domestic-
violence survivors, disabled veterans, families facing home 
foreclosures, nonprofit organizations, small businesses, and others.22 
Clients with civil legal matters would not otherwise have access to 
legal assistance, and the state would have to pay for the defense of 
                                                                                                                 
19 A special task force of the ABA identified law school clinics as especially well-
equipped to teach law students the lawyering skills and professional values they must develop to 
be effective lawyers. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A.B.A., 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 46 
(Robert MacCrate ed., Student Ed. 1992) [hereinafter THE MACCRATE REPORT] (describing law 
school clinics as providing training and experience to students on poverty law issues).  
20 The ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools state that “[a] law school shall offer 
substantial opportunities for: . . . live-client or other real-life practice experiences, appropriately 
supervised and designed to encourage reflection by students on their experiences and on the 
values and responsibilities of the legal profession, and the development of one’s ability to assess 
his or her performance and level of competence . . . . ” STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS Standard 302(b)(1) (2010–2011) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. Law schools comply 
with ABA Standards by having either an in-house clinical program, where full-time faculty 
primarily supervise students, or an externship program, where lawyers or judges who are not 
full-time faculty primarily supervise students, or both internal and external clinical programs. 
Peter A. Joy, The MacCrate Report: Moving Toward Integrated Learning Experiences, 1 
CLINICAL L. REV. 401, 405 (1994).  
21 DAVID A. SANTACROCE & ROBERT R. KUEHN, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED 
LEGAL EDUCATION, REPORT OF THE 2007-2008 SURVEY 19–20, available at http://www.csale. 
org/files/CSALE.07-08.Survey.Report.pdf. 
22 Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, “Kneecapping” Academic Freedom, 96 ACADEME 8, 
9 (Nov./Dec. 2010). 
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indigent clients facing criminal charges if clinic representation was 
not available to them.23 
By providing needed legal representation to individuals and groups 
who would otherwise not have legal representation in civil matters, 
law school clinics serve a critical role in making access to the courts, 
and therefore access to justice, available to tens of thousands clients 
each year.24 This access to the courts and the opportunity to 
participate in legal processes has been called “a right that protects all 
other rights.”25 
Some have also argued that the clinic clients and cases become the 
teaching materials that clinical faculty use with law students, in the 
same way that classroom faculty use textbooks.26 But unlike faculty 
teaching and students learning in the classroom, clinic client 
representation sometimes involves students and faculty who represent 
individuals and community groups in matters involving powerful 
interests. As the Maryland and Louisiana legislative actions 
demonstrate, sometimes the powerful interests employ strategies and 
tactics aimed at eliminating the legal representation of their opponents 
by law school clinics. Not only does such governmental interference 
threaten access to the courts for clinic clients, but the interference also 
seeks to control educational decisions about the types of cases 
selected for teaching students. Inevitably, government interference in 
such decisions raises academic freedom concerns. 
                                                                                                                 
23 Id. 
24  SANTACROCE & KUEHN, supra note 21, at 19–20. 
25 Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Law Schools, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 193, 199 
(1999). 
26 For example, Elizabeth M. Schneider has argued:  
Selection of individual cases to handle and methods of handling those cases, like the 
selection of casebooks and classroom teaching approaches, lies at the very heart of 
the educational function of clinical programs. So long as the decisions made by a 
clinical teacher reasonably serve that educational function, a judgment that only the 
law school faculty is capable of making, these decisions should be protected by 
academic freedom. 
Schneider, supra note 17, at 190. The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) has 
advanced the position that clinical teachers “have a First Amendment right to select cases as 
their course materials for their clinics.” Submission of the Association of American Law Schools 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana Concerning the Review of the Supreme Court’s 
Student Practice Rule, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 539, 557 (1998). Another commentator argues that 
while faculty teaching clinical courses make a number of educational judgments about their 
classes, including the types of cases appropriate for their students’ education, the choice of cases 
for litigation does not deserve the same degree of academic freedom as scholarship. J. Peter 
Byrne, Academic Freedom and Political Neutrality in Law Schools: An Essay on Structure and 
Ideology in Professional Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 335–36 (1993). 
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II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AS A NORM AND LEGAL RIGHT 
Academic freedom on university campuses regulating 
relationships between the individual faculty member and 
administrators is much more developed as a norm than it is as a legal 
right that courts protect. Academic freedom first emerged as a 
principle within academia in the United States when the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) issued its Declaration 
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure in 1915.27 
The 1915 Declaration announced that academic freedom for faculty 
consisted of “freedom of inquiry, and research; freedom of teaching 
within the university or college; and freedom of extramural utterance 
and action.”28  
In a later 1940 statement, the AAUP expressed the norm that 
academic freedom guarantees professors “freedom in the classroom in 
discussing their subject” provided they do not “introduce into their 
teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their subject.”29 
Matthew Finkin and Robert Post explain that this norm of academic 
freedom for each teacher is necessary because “students cannot learn 
how to exercise a mature independence of mind unless their 
instructors are themselves free to model independent thought in the 
classroom.”30 
As a constitutional concept, academic freedom is ill-defined and 
illusive.31 First, it is not enumerated as a freedom or right in the First 
                                                                                                                 
27 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE 
(1915), in AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 291–301 app. 1 
(10th. ed. 2006). Walter Metzger has written an informative article explaining the development 
of the academic profession and academic freedom in the United States. Walter P. Metzger, 
Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 1265 (1988). Metzger explains how the committee that drafted the 1915 Declaration was 
greatly influenced by the concept of academic freedom in Germany, which, by the late 
nineteenth century, meant freedom in learning, teaching, and academic self-government. Id. at 
1269–70. The recognition of academic freedom and the need for autonomy in academic affairs 
goes back further to medieval times. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 5–6 (1955) (stating that 
universities in the Middle Ages were centers of power and prestige, self-governing, and 
protected by authorities). In the United States, the founding of Harvard, Princeton, William and 
Mary, and Yale continued in the tradition of independent, self-governing universities. Id. at 120, 
124.  
28 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 27, at 292. 
29 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE WITH 1970 
INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS, in AM. ASSN OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS & 
REPORTS 3–11 (10th. ed. 2006). AAUP and the Association of American Colleges and 
Universities jointly drafted the 1940 Statement and 1970 Interpretive Comments. Id. at 3. 
30 MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF 
AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 81 (2009). 
31 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 27, at 1289 (“A sizeable literature of legal commentary 
asserts that the Supreme Court constitutionalized academic freedom without adequately defining 
it.”).  
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Amendment or anywhere else in the Constitution. Second, whatever 
constitutional protection there may be for academic freedom, it is 
solely against state action—that is, the action of some governmental 
actor.32 This means that unless a governmental actor has the ability to 
intrude in the affairs of a private university, there is no protection. 
Third, the extent of academic freedom for an individual faculty 
member is unclear,33 especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.34  
In Garcetti, the Court held that the First Amendment only protects 
a public employee’s speech when the employee speaks as a citizen.35 
The Court expressly left open the question of whether its holding 
“would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related 
to scholarship or teaching.”36  
While the Garcetti Court appeared to signal that faculty teaching 
and scholarship were different than public employee speech and 
entitled to greater First Amendment protection, the circuit courts have 
not been so generous. Some recent cases illustrate this point. 
In the Seventh Circuit case of Renken v. Gregory,37 Kevin Renken, 
a tenured engineering professor at the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, refused to sign a proposal letter from the University in 
connection with a National Science Foundation (NSF) grant awarded 
to him and other professors, claiming that the University’s terms did 
not comply with NSF regulations.38 Renken also complained to 
                                                                                                                 
32  There is a distinction between the constitutional limitations on universities that are 
public and those that are private. A private university is not limited by the First Amendment 
unless it can be established that the university is exercising power as a state actor. See J. Peter 
Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251, 
300 (1989); JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 3.05 (6)(a) (2010). 
33 While the United States Supreme Court has called academic freedom “a special concern 
of the First Amendment,” Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), what this 
means in terms of rights and remedies is unclear, especially in disputes between a faculty 
member and her university. Peter Byrne maintains that the First Amendment gives university 
administrators “extensive control over curricular judgments so long as they do not penalize a 
professor solely for his political viewpoint.” Byrne, supra note 32, at 301–02. Conversely, 
David Rabban argues that the Supreme Court’s recognition of institutional academic freedom 
for the university “does not support the additional conclusion that the Court has rejected a 
constitutional right of individual professors to academic freedom against trustees, 
administrators, and faculty peers.” David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of “Individual” 
and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 227, 280 (1990). Michael Olivas interprets the cases as protecting professors from 
outside interference, such as from grand juries and others, but providing only “limited protection 
to professors’ intramural speech or classroom activities against institutional interests.” Michael 
A. Olivas, Reflections on Professorial Academic Freedom: Second Thoughts on the Third 
“Essential Freedom,” 45 STAN. L. REV. 1835, 1837 (1993). 
34 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
35 Id. at 423. 
36 Id. at 425. 
37 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008). 
38 Id. at 771–73. 
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university officials, including the Secretary of the University’s Board 
of Regents.39 When the university was unable to reach a resolution 
with Renken, it returned the grant money and reduced his pay.40 
Renken brought a First Amendment claim, alleging that University 
retaliated against him for his complaints, and the district court granted 
the University’s motion for summary judgment.41 The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the decision after determining that applying for grants was 
part of Renken’s teaching duties, but that Renken’s speech was not 
protected by the First Amendment because he “made his complaints 
regarding the University’s use of NSF funds pursuant to his official 
duties as a University professor.”42  
In two other cases, the Ninth and Third Circuits ruled against 
tenured professors who asserted that their First Amendment rights had 
been violated.43 While both circuits ruled in favor of the universities, 
in each instance the court left open the question of whether there is 
some category of First Amendment protection for faculty at public 
universities acting in their official capacity.  
In Hong v. Grant,44 the district court granted summary judgment 
for the defendants because the professor’s speech was in connection 
with his official duties as a faculty member and thus was not entitled 
to First Amendment protection against alleged retaliation by the 
university.45 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
but on the ground that the defendants were entitled to sovereign 
immunity.46 In dicta, the Ninth Circuit noted that Garcetti was unclear 
whether professors have “a First Amendment right to comment on 
faculty administrative matters without retaliation.”47 
In Gorum v. Sessoms,48 Wendell Gorum, a tenured professor and 
chair of the Mass Communications Department at Delaware State 
University, was dismissed for changing grades in violation of the 
collective bargaining agreement.49 Gorum filed suit alleging that he 
was dismissed in retaliation for expressing his views in three 
instances: objecting to the selection of Allen Sessoms as university 
                                                                                                                 
39 Id. at 772. 
40 Id. at 773. 
41 Id. Renken filed suit under 42 U.S.C § 1983. Id.  
42 Id. at 775. 
43 Hong v. Grant, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23504, (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 2010); Gorum v. 
Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2009).  
44 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23504 (9th Cir. 
Nov. 12, 2010). 
45 Id. at 1166–70. 
46 Hong, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23504, at *4. 
47 Id. 
48 561 F.3d 179 (3rd Cir. 2009). 
49 Id. at 182–83.  
 2/4/2011 1:56:50 PM 
1096 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:4 
president; assisting a student athlete in challenging a university 
disciplinary action; and rescinding an invitation to Sessoms to speak 
at a fraternity event where Gorum served as chair of the event’s 
speakers committee.50 The district court granted summary judgment 
to the defendants,51 and the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
reasoning that Gorum was speaking as part of his official duties and 
that his actions “were not ‘speech related to scholarship or teaching,’ 
and because we believe that such determination here does not ‘imperil 
First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges 
and universities.’”52 
As these three post-Garcetti cases illustrate, protection from the 
courts for individual faculty claims of academic freedom is uncertain. 
While this is instructive for all faculty at public universities, as a 
practical matter it would only become important for law school 
faculty teaching clinical courses should law school or university 
administrators interfere with how the faculty teach their courses. 
When it comes to government interference in clinical programs, 
individual clinical faculty who have the support of their institutions 
may find some protection if their university, or law school if free 
standing, asserts institutional academic freedom, which is a more 
developed constitutional concept. Indeed, some commentators point 
out that some courts “have indicated that constitutional academic 
freedom is an institutional right, not necessarily an individual right.”53 
Institutional academic freedom is typically understood by the 
courts to mean that the university can set its own academic policies 
such as who may teach, what may be taught, how material shall be 
taught, and who may be admitted to study.54 This has resulted in 
                                                                                                                 
50 Id. at 183–84. 
51  Id. at 184. 
52 Id. at 186 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 
(2006) (Souter, J. dissenting)). 
53 Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom and the 
Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 145 
(2009). Tepper and White cite to several circuit cases, but note that in Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578, 586 n.6 (1987), the Supreme Court “suggest[ed], in a religious freedom case, that 
academic freedom allows instructors to teach material consistent with their professional 
judgment.” Tepper & White, supra, at 145 n.130. 
54 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of 
Powell, J.) (“It is the business of the university to provide that atmosphere which is most 
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 
[sic] ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university—to determine for itself on academic grounds 
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to 
study.’” (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in result)). Justice Frankfurter identified these four freedoms of a university—
academic autonomy in deciding who may teach, what is taught, how it is taught, and who may 
be admitted to study—from a statement by South African scholars who argued that such 
freedoms were necessary for “a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive 
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judicial deference to institutional academic decisions, and the 
Supreme Court has said judges “may not override it unless it is such a 
substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to 
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually 
exercise professional judgment.”55  
Because courts typically defer to universities for their educational 
decisions, they may be more responsive to university challenges of 
government intrusion into the university’s ability to decide what may 
be taught, such as what type of clinical program it chooses to have. In 
addition, a state may have delegated authority concerning university 
educational decisions to an authority outside of the control of the 
state’s legislature.  
For example, the California Supreme Court has determined that 
the Regents of the University of California “have full power and 
authority, and it is their duty, to prescribe the nature and extent of the 
courses to be given, and to determine the question of what students 
shall be required to pursue them.”56 The California Constitution 
provides, however, that this authority is “subject only to such 
legislative control as may be necessary to insure the security of its 
funds and compliance with the terms of the endowments of the 
university.”57  
The Michigan Court of Appeals confirmed that the Regents of the 
University of Michigan have control of all internal operations, and 
legislative attempts to condition appropriations on matters “solely 
within the exclusive authority of the [Regents],” such as 
“determin[ing] the number of out-of-state student 
enrollments, . . . set[ting] the fees to be charged such students, 
                                                                                                                 
 
to speculation, experiment and creation.” Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in 
the result) (quoting The Open Univ. in S. Afr. 10–12 statement of a conference of senior 
scholars from the Univ. of Cape Town and the Univ. of Witwatersrand). 
55 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985). In University of 
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990), the Court rejected a university’s claim that its 
academic-freedom rights created a privilege against discovery of peer evaluations of faculty 
candidates relevant to race and sex discrimination charges. In reaching its decision, the Court 
noted that the discovery request was content neutral and did not implicate academic decisions. 
Id. at 198–99. The Court explained that it was not eroding institutional academic freedom as 
recognized by Ewing, and “[n]othing we say today should be understood as a retreat from this 
principle of respect for legitimate academic decisionmaking.” Id. at 199. 
56 Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 28 P.2d 355, 355 (Cal. 1934).  
57 CAL. CONST, art. IX, § 9(a). The California Supreme Court cited an earlier version of 
this provision in Hamilton, 28 P.2d at 355 (“The Constitution of the State of California (art 9, 
§ 9) reposes in the Regents of the University of California full powers of organization and 
government of the university, ‘subject only to such legislative control as may be necessary to 
insure compliance with the terms of the endowments of the university and the security of its 
funds.’” (quoting CAL. CONST, art. IX, § 9(a))). 
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and . . . prescrib[ing] the minimum number of classroom hours to be 
taught by the faculty are matters ” violated the Michigan 
Constitution.58  
Even if a state has insulated public universities from legislative or 
other governmental interference into internal matters, the overall 
budget allocations still remain in the hands of the state legislatures. 
This leaves the question of how far the protections of academic 
freedom reach when the government seeks to interfere in academic 
programs, such as the threatened legislation in Maryland and 
Louisiana against law school clinical programs. If academic freedom 
does not provide protection, are there any other legal bases for a 
remedy? 
III. GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE WITH CLINICAL PROGRAMS: 
DENYING ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
A. Access to Justice 
Access to the courts is a precondition for justice, and individuals 
and groups usually must have lawyers to represent them in asserting 
their rights properly before courts and other tribunals.59 But rather 
than let the rule of law operate as it should in administrative 
proceedings or courtrooms, the examples from Maryland and 
Louisiana illustrate how powerful interests sometimes employ 
extralegal strategies—strategies that transcend normal legal 
processes—to obtain desired outcomes.60 The aim of these and other 
efforts is to eliminate law school clinic representation for the poor in 
cases against powerful corporate or governmental interests—
essentially de-lawyering the poor and locking them out of the 
courtroom. 
Government attempts to interfere with clinical programs providing 
access to justice for their clients are not the only types of restrictions 
on lawyers representing the poor. For example in 1996, the federal 
appropriation for Legal Services Corporation (LSC) included a 
                                                                                                                 
58 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Michigan, 208 N.W.2d 871, 882 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1973), aff’d in part, 235 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1975) (citing MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5). 
59 See, e.g., Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 
73 YALE L.J. 1317, 1336 (1964) (arguing that available remedies may be lost without a lawyer 
to present a client’s claim properly). 
60 See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying 
Access to Justice, 74 TUL. L. REV. 235, 272–77 (1999) (discussing an application of LoPucki’s 
and Weyrauch’s theory of extralegal strategies to explain how business interests and some 
government officials lobbied the Louisiana Supreme Court to curtail clinical programs by 
making the Louisiana student practice rule more restrictive); Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. 
Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405, 1457–62 (2000) (describing various 
strategies that transcend legal decision makers). 
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number of restrictions on the types of cases LSC lawyers may handle. 
Those restrictions include preventing LSC lawyers from participating 
in class action cases,61 collecting court-awarded attorney fees,62 
representing incarcerated individuals,63 or representing various 
classes of non-citizens, many of whom have legal immigration 
status.64 The appropriations bill also sought to prohibit LSC lawyers 
from representing any client in challenging the validity of state or 
federal welfare system law.65  
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,66 the Supreme Court 
invalidated the provision that sought to prohibit the LSC lawyers 
from challenging the validity of state or federal welfare laws.67 The 
Court decided that the government-funded legal services program 
“was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a 
governmental message.”68 In addition, the Court noted that a LSC 
attorney, similar to a government-funded public defender, is bound by 
ethics rules that require the lawyer to exercise independent judgment 
from government control.69 Thus, the Court stated that this case was 
distinguishable from Rust v. Sullivan,70 in which the Court permitted 
the government to prevent federally funded programs from providing 
abortion counseling.71 
The Velazquez Court stated that although Congress was not 
required to fund LSC to represent indigent clients or fund all types of 
legal representation once it did, Congress could not “insulate its own 
laws from legitimate judicial challenge.”72 The Court reasoned that 
the restriction “threatens severe impairment of the judicial function” 
because it “sifts out cases presenting constitutional challenges in 
order to insulate the Government’s laws from judicial inquiry.”73 The 
Court found that the law was an impermissible restriction on speech 
                                                                                                                 
61 Omnibus Consol. Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–134, 
§ 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1321-53 (1996). 
62 Id. § 504(a)(13), 110 Stat. at 1321-55. 
63 Id. § 504(a)(15), 110 Stat. at 1321-55. 
64 Id. § 504(a)(11), 110 Stat. at 1321-54. 
65 Id. § 504(a)(16), 110 Stat. at 1321-55-56. 
66 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
67 Id. at 549. 
68 Id. at 542. 
69 Id. (noting that LSC lawyers are similar to public defenders in that each operates 
independently of governmental control). 
70 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
71  Id. at 203. 
72 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548. 
73 Id. at 546. The Court stated that if the law stood, “[t]he courts and the public would 
come to question the adequacy and fairness of professional representations when the attorney, 
either consciously to comply with this statute or unconsciously to continue the representation 
despite the statute, avoided all reference to questions of statutory validity and constitutional 
authority.” Id. 
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and a violation of the First Amendment.74 In separate litigation, 
challenges to the other restrictions on equal protection and due 
process grounds failed.75 
The 1996 appropriations bill and the Velazquez case demonstrate 
two principles. First, the government may be able to restrict some 
types of cases or clients that government-funded lawyers can 
represent. Second, government-imposed restrictions may not 
impermissibly curtail First Amendment rights by limiting the legal 
arguments lawyers may present on behalf of clients.  
B. Government Interference in Law School Clinics 
Publicized instances of government interference in clinical 
programs educating students and providing access to justice for 
clients can be traced back to the 1960s. The expansion of law school 
clinical programs began in the 1960s,76 even though clinical legal 
education has existed in some form nearly as long as there have been 
university-based law schools in the United States.77 As law school 
clinics expanded, the clinical programs began “to represent 
client[s] . . . with claims that thrust clinical programs into the civil 
rights, consumer rights, environmental rights, and poverty rights 
movements.”78 By representing clients who might not otherwise have 
lawyers in areas of the law that were in the early stages of 
development, clinical faculty and students were sometimes advancing 
client claims that challenged the status quo. 
The first publicized governmental interference in a clinical 
program involved controversial client representation that took place at 
the University of Mississippi School of Law in 1968.79 Prompted by 
complaints from some state legislators and university trustees, the 
Chancellor directed the law school dean to fire two professors for 
                                                                                                                 
74 Id. at 547. 
75 See Legal Aid Soc’y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting plaintiffs’ equal protection and due process claims for lack of standing), vacated in 
part, 981 F. Supp. 1288 (1997); see also Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 762 n.4 
(2d Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court’s rejection of plaintiff’s due process and equal 
protection claims), aff’d, 531 U.S. 533 (2000). 
76 See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Legal 
Education for this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 5–32 (2000) (describing 
the development of clinical legal education in the United States). 
77 The first types of real-life opportunities for law students to assist with legal problems 
were legal dispensaries or legal aid bureaus affiliated with law schools in the late 1890s and 
early 1900s. See John S. Bradway, The Nature of a Legal Aid Clinic, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 173, 174 
(1930) (describing experimental efforts to engage law students in legal aid work at several law 
schools); William V. Rowe, Legal Clinics and Better Trained Lawyers—A Necessity, 11 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 591, 591 (1917) (noting the adoption of legal clinics at several law schools).  
78 Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 76, at 13. 
79 Trister v. Univ. of Miss., 420 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1969).  
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their participation with clinical law students in a school desegregation 
case being handled by a local legal services office.80 The law school 
dean claimed that the professors violated a university policy that 
permitted outside employment only if “it does not bring the employee 
into antagonism with his colleagues, community, or the State of 
Mississippi.”81  
The two professors filed suit in federal court alleging that their 
termination was a denial of equal protection because other faculty 
were not held to the same standard. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed, and held that the University had 
unlawfully discriminated against the professors, violating their equal 
protection and due process rights, because the professors “wished to 
continue to represent clients who tended to be unpopular.”82 In 
response to the loss in the courts, and findings by the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the American 
Association of Law Schools (AALS) that the University’s actions had 
violated the professors’ academic freedom,83 the University rescinded 
its policy on outside employment and offered to reinstate the 
professors.84 
While the court vindicated the legal rights of the faculty at the 
University of Mississippi, it used equal protection and due process—
not academic freedom—as the source of the legal right and remedy. 
Since that first reported case, there have been over thirty additional 
instances of interference in law school clinical programs.85 By 
interference, I mean serious attempts to undermine the work of the 
clinic, usually in the form of stopping the clinic from undertaking 
certain types of representation.86 Most often, the interference has been 
aimed at preventing law school clinics from representing clients in 
matters involving corporate and government interests. In each 
instance, the interference is calculated to chill the actions of clinical 
faculty and students in their legal representation of clients who 
otherwise would not be able to have access to the courts.  
                                                                                                                 
80 Id. at 501–02. 
81 Id. at 501 n.2. 
82 Id. at 504. 
83 THE UNIV. OF MISSISSIPPI, AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS BULL. 75, 83–85 (Spring 1970). 
84 Id. at 85. 
85 See Robert R. Kuehn & Bridget M. McCormack, Lessons from Forty Years of 
Interference in Law School Clinics, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59, app. (2011). 
86 Almost every clinical program has experienced some minor interference, such as a 
disgruntled alumnus of the law school complaining because the clinic is on the opposite side in 
a case, or a donor to a university who finds the clinic representing a client opposing the donor’s 
interests. Those instances are so prevalent that most clinical faculty simply expect them, and 
fortunately most law school deans understand and support their clinical faculty and students 
when that occurs. 
 2/4/2011 1:56:50 PM 
1102 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:4 
Rather than review all of the publicized instances of interference in 
law school clinics,87 I instead focus on instances of government 
interference, especially those instances in which litigation over the 
interference ensued. I do so in order to identify limitations on the 
government and possible legal remedies. 
Like the recent effort in Louisiana, there are a number of state 
legislators and other governmental actors who have interfered with 
whom the law school clinics represent and what claims they raise. In 
1971, not long after the interference in Mississippi, Connecticut 
Governor Meskill, as well as members of the local bar, complained 
when the University of Connecticut Law School clinic defended an 
antiwar protestor.88 The complaints came with a threat to terminate 
state funding, and the dean of the law school responded by proposing 
that clinical faculty be required to seek approval by the dean or a 
faculty committee before taking on clients.89 In response, a clinic 
professor requested and received an ABA advisory ethics opinion that 
case-by-case prior approval would violate the ethical obligations of 
the dean and faculty in making these decisions and the clinical faculty 
members’ independent judgment would be impaired.90 The opinion 
also stated that the dean and faculty “should seek to avoid 
establishing guidelines . . . that prohibit acceptance of controversial 
clients and cases or that prohibit acceptance of cases aligning the 
legal aid clinic against public officials, governmental agencies or 
influential members of the community.”91 The law school 
subsequently abandoned the oversight process.92 
                                                                                                                 
87 Robert Kuehn and Bridget McCormack provide an excellent review of the publicized 
instances of interference in law school clinical programs. See generally Kuehn & McCormack, 
supra note 85. 
88 Schneider, supra note 17, at 184. 
89 Id.; see also Kuehn & Joy, supra note 18, at 1977 nn.19 & 20 and accompanying text. 
90 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1208 (1972), reprinted in 
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL AND 
INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 441 (1975) [hereinafter Informal Op. 1208]. The opinion states that 
prior approval “makes it likely that the independent judgment of the five clinic lawyers and their 
loyalty to their clients will be impaired” and would “violate the professional ethics and 
responsibilities of the dean and of the lawyer-directors of the clinic.” Id. ABA ethics opinions 
are not binding on lawyers or courts. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Informal Op. 1420 
(1978), reprinted in ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL AND INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 312, 316 (1985) (”Enforcement of 
legal ethics and disciplinary procedures are local matters securely within the jurisdictional 
prerogative of each state . . . .”). Instead, they serve as guidance and may be a safe harbor or 
persuasive authority. See Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More 
Effective Regulation of Lawyers’ Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 330–37 (2002) 
(describing the ways in which state courts treat ethics opinions). 
91 Informal Op. 1208. 
92 Kuehn & Joy, supra note 18, at 1977. 
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This ABA ethics opinion is important because it states both that 
prior case-by-case approval is ethically prohibited and that the legal 
profession’s obligation to make legal assistance available, even to 
unpopular clients and causes, instructs clinical programs not to adopt 
policies that prevent representing clients with legal claims against 
government entities or other powerful interests.93  
The next incident took place in 1975, when the Arkansas 
legislature, in response to a University of Arkansas at Fayetteville law 
professor’s participation in a civil rights case, passed an 
appropriations bill that made it unlawful for law school faculty 
holding certain positions at the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville 
to participate “in the handling of any law suit in any of the courts of 
this State or of the federal courts.”94 The Arkansas Supreme Court 
found that the restriction was a violation of equal protection because 
it applied to only certain law faculty members and to only one of the 
two state law schools.95 The court did not address the law professors’ 
First Amendment argument that the law was passed to silence a 
specific professor, concluding that the argument was “entirely 
speculative” and the court would not inquire into the motives or intent 
of legislators not expressed in the legislation.96  
Although the Arkansas appropriations bill was not specifically 
directed at a law school clinical program, it is instructive of the limits 
on such legislative actions. Like the interference at the University of 
Mississippi, legislation or other types of governmental restrictions 
that target specific law professors or groups of law professors are 
subject to claims that the actions violate equal protection rights. 
In the 1980s, other legislation in Colorado, Idaho, and Iowa, aimed 
at law school clinics, or that would apply to law school clinical 
faculty, either failed in committee, passed only one house, or was 
vetoed by the governor.97 The only legislation that met with a 
                                                                                                                 
93 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2010), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_c
onduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html (“Legal representation 
should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is 
controversial or the subject of popular disapproval.”). In addition, a lawyer has a professional 
responsibility to accept a fair share of unpopular matters and indigent or unpopular clients. Id. at 
R. 6.2 cmt. 1. The Preamble to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct also states that all 
lawyers should devote time and resources “to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all 
those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal 
counsel.” Id. at pmbl. ¶ 6. 
94 Atkinson v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark., 559 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Ark. 1977); see also 
Schneider, supra note 17, at 184 (describing the passage of the appropriations bill provision 
barring law school faculty from participating in any lawsuit within Arkansas). 
95 Atkinson, 559 S.W.2d at 475–77.  
96 Id. at 476. 
97 See Kuehn & Joy, supra note 18, at 1977–78, 1980. 
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measure of success was a budget bill that contained language 
prohibiting the Arizona State University College of Law from 
representing prisoners in litigation against the state.98 This was 
apparently a compromise to an effort to insert a budget rider that 
would have required the university to cease funding for the law 
school’s clinic.99 The university did not challenge this restriction, and 
the clinic has continued to follow the restriction.100 Whether the 
restriction would have survived a legal challenge is unresolved.  
In another instance of government interference in clinical 
programs, the governor of Louisiana urged business groups to lobby 
the elected judges of the Louisiana Supreme Court to make the 
Louisiana student practice rule more restrictive in reaction to failed 
efforts to force the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic to drop a 
lawsuit against a large petrochemical company.101 In 1999, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court responded by adopting very low income 
guidelines for clients to qualify for assistance, requiring 51% of the 
members of community organizations represented by clinical students 
to meet the income guidelines, and preventing clinical students from 
representing any client if the client had been solicited for 
representation by anyone associated with the clinical program.102 
Several of the Tulane law clinic’s clients, five law professors from 
Tulane and Loyola Law School in New Orleans, a donor to the 
Tulane clinic, and a number of law students filed suit in federal court 
to challenge the restrictions, alleging viewpoint discrimination and 
violations of equal protection, academic freedom, First Amendment 
rights of free speech and association, and the right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances.103 The district court granted the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s motion to dismiss all claims, reasoning 
that “the Louisiana Supreme Court’s actions were not illegal or 
unconstitutional,” though they have been influenced by some 
“nondiscriminatory political motive.”104  
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference v. Supreme Court of Louisiana,105 emphasizing that the 
                                                                                                                 
98 Id. at 1980. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 See Joy, supra note 18, at 244–46. 
102 See id. at 238–39 (citing LA. SUP. CT. R. XX (1999)). 
103 S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Sup. Ct. of La., 61 F. Supp. 2d 499, 502–03 
(E.D. La. 1999), aff’d, 252 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2001). 
104 Id. at 513–14. The district court noted that “in Louisiana, where state judges are elected, 
one cannot claim complete surprise when political pressure somehow manifests itself within the 
judiciary.” Id. at 513. 
105 252 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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student-practice rule changes restricted solely the law students—not 
the clinical faculty, as licensed attorneys—in terms of who they could 
represent.106 The Fifth Circuit also distinguished the practice rule 
restrictions on clinical students from the government’s restrictions on 
lawyer advocacy in Velazquez, and emphasized that the student 
practice rule “imposes no restrictions on the kind of representations 
the clinics can engage in or on the arguments that can be made on 
behalf of a clinic client.”107 In making this effort to distinguish the 
types of restrictions, the Fifth Circuit suggests that restrictions on 
lawyer advocacy in clinical programs would be impermissible.  
C. Louisiana Senate Bill 549 
The history of government interference in clinical programs 
provides a useful framework for considering Louisiana Senate Bill 
549, the initiative that would have barred law school clinics that 
receive public funds from suing companies or government entities 
unless the legislature specifically approved each lawsuit.108 Unlike the 
student-practice rule amendments, which applied only to law 
students, Senate Bill 549 would have applied to licensed lawyers as 
well because it sought to regulate their practice of law by restricting 
the types of legal claims that could be asserted. This type of 
restriction appears to run afoul of recognized ethical and legal 
obligations. 
The case-by-case approval required for suits against companies 
and government entities is contrary to ethical rules as stated in the 
ABA ethics opinion developed after such a restriction was proposed 
in Connecticut.109 In addition, review of possible cases by the 
legislature or anyone else not part of the clinic law office raises 
serious client confidentiality issues. Another ABA ethics opinion 
states, “[i]t is difficult to see how the preservation of confidences and 
secrets of a client can be held inviolate prior to filing an action when 
the proposed action is described to those outside of the legal services 
office.”110 Although a client may give informed consent for revealing 
such information,111 it is impermissible to condition legal 
                                                                                                                 
106 Id. at 789 (“The rule only prohibits the non-lawyer student members of the clinics 
from representing as attorneys any party the clinic has so solicited.”). 
107 Id. at 792. 
108 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
109 See supra note 88. 
110 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974), reprinted in 
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL AND 
INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 84 (1985). 
111 “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless 
the client gives informed consent.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2010). The 
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representation on a client’s consent to disclosure of confidences to 
others.112 
Requiring case-by-case approval also would have interfered with 
the client-attorney relationship, raising separation-of-power concerns. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court “has exclusive and plenary power to 
define and regulate all facets of the practice of law, including . . . the 
client-attorney relationship.”113 Because the legislation sought to 
regulate the practice of law, the Louisiana Supreme Court would have 
had to approve the law or acquiesce to it.114 
In addition, the proposed legislation’s restrictions of the types of 
legal claims that could be brought were similar to the type the 
Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Velazquez.115 As discussed 
previously, the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding changes to the 
Louisiana student-practice rule did so distinguishing the facts before 
it from those in Velazquez and emphasizing that the student-practice 
rule changes did not seek to limit the First Amendment rights of 
licensed attorneys in Louisiana. 
If Senate Bill 549 had become law, there would have been good 
grounds to challenge it. Based on the serious ethical and legal 
concerns such legislation raises, there is reason to believe that the 
courts would be sympathetic.  
CONCLUSION 
Fortunately, recent legislative efforts to interfere with the 
educational and service missions of law school clinical programs 
were not successful. As this review of the history of such efforts 
demonstrates, there are limits on government interference in clinical 
programs. Legislation or governmental policies aimed at subsets of 
faculty may trigger cognizable equal protection claims.116 Restrictions 
on clinical faculty, who are licensed lawyers, making decisions about 
                                                                                                                 
 
Louisiana ethics rules track this language. LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2010) 
(adopting the Model Rules language verbatim). 
112 See, e.g., State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI–210 
(1994) (holding that a legal services office may not condition receipt of legal services on client 
consenting to disclosure of client confidences to the program’s non-lawyer director (citing N.H. 
Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Ethics, Formal Op. 1988-89/13 (1989)), available at http://www.michbar. 
org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/ri-210.htm?CFID=28280112&CFTOKEN=a73b215d77 
a4ffa0-D8E5FF3D-1A4B-3375-E478D575415ED438. 
113 Succession of Wallace, 574 So.2d 348, 350 (La. 1991). 
114 “[T]he legislature cannot enact laws defining or regulating the practice of law in any 
aspect without this court’s approval or acquiescence because that power properly belongs to this 
court and is reserved for it by the constitutional separation of powers.” Id. 
115 See supra text accompanying notes 68–75. 
116 See supra text accompanying notes 85, 95–96. 
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legal theories to pursue on behalf of clients, raise First Amendment 
concerns.117 Even restrictions that seek to require case-by-case review 
of potential clients or types of cases that may be brought trigger 
ethical concerns,118 as well as possible separation-of-power issues 
requiring the approval of a state’s highest court.119 
Although there appear to be remedies for some types of 
interference, the recent Maryland and Louisiana failed legislative 
attempts demonstrate that it is preferable to prevent government 
interference rather than waiting to challenge it in the courts. Not only 
is this true today, but this was true when law schools and universities 
successfully blocked similar legislative efforts in other states during 
the 1980s.120  
The ABA has been involved in speaking out against such 
interference,121 as have other national organizations, and many 
individuals.122 The ABA House of Delegates recently passed a 
resolution that reaffirms the ABA’s “support for the ethical 
independence of law school clinical programs[,] . . . opposes attempts 
by persons or institutions outside law schools to interfere in the 
ongoing activities of law school clinical programs and 
courses[,] . . . [and resolves] [t]hat the ABA will assist law schools, as 
appropriate, in preserving the independence of clinical programs and 
courses.”123 
These efforts are good, but they are not enough. Whenever access 
to the courts is being threatened, everyone should be concerned. 
Fairness in the courts requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard, 
and without legal representation, the right to be heard is often an 
empty promise. 
 
                                                                                                                 
117 See supra text accompanying notes 72–74. 
118 See supra notes 90–93, 109–12 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
120 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 3, 7–8. The ABA Council on Legal Education and 
Admissions to the Bar has issued the following statement pledging its support for clinical 
programs against outside interference: 
Improper attempts by persons or institutions outside law schools to interfere in the 
ongoing activities of law school clinical programs and courses have an adverse 
impact on the quality of the educational mission of affected law schools and 
jeopardize principles of law school self-governance, academic freedom, and ethical 
independence under the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. In appropriate 
ways, the Council shall assist law schools in preserving the independence of law 
school clinical programs and courses. 
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 20, at Council Statement 9.  
122 See supra text accompanying notes 4–5. 
123ABA Res. 100A (2011), available at http://www.abanow.org/2011/01/100a/. 
